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Within the context ofthe Post~Cold War international system, the annulled presidential
elections in Nigeria in 1993 and the subsequent hanging ofKen Saro~Wiwa and eight
members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1995, the
paper examines the argumentfor economic sanctions as a tool for international regime
change. It clarifies the historical impact ofcolonialism and how that experience continues
to constrain the use oftraditional strategies ofeconomic sanction t~ attempt to influence
African governments, especially authoritarian governments. It argues that, if economic
sanction as a tool of statecraft is to result in regime change, then its tj/icacy needs to be
reexamined as it failed to influence Abacha's administration behavior, because of the
ubsence of a coherent and sustained internal action b.y indigenous elites that desired
an alternative governance structure from authoritarianism. Indeed, the paper suggests
that without an internal coalition to counter the impact ofauthoritarianism within the
domestic political space, especially in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries like
Xigeria, there is no identifiable external interest for initiating regime change from the
outside; therifore, economic sanctions are likely to be minimally supported by western
gol'ernments who are likely to prifer strong rhetoric in support offree market and
democratic principles.
Introduction
As a state, Nigeria is a creation of European colonial powers. The struggle for
political independence by Africans was significantly helped by events in the
international system-the end of World War II, which significantly weakened
Britain, France and other colonialists to hurriedly transfer power to indigenous
elites in the 1950s and 1960s. One of the setbacks of the decolonization policies
was the absence of effective mechanisms for conflict resolution without violence.
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This lacuna was manifested in the national politics of the newly independent
territories by the closure of political spaces, especially during the Cold War.
Speci6cally in the case of Nigeria, the civil war (1967~1970) had international
implications for the ideologically structured Cold War COntest~tween the United
States and the former Soviet Union and their allies. To the extent that the major
powers such as the United States and Britain were bogged down by events that
directly threatened their inRuence and credibility, e.g., the Vietnam and the Gulf
Wars, they paid less attention to events in peripheral States like Nigeria where
their national interests were
not directly threatened. However, the major powers have not failed to exploit
"peace time" opportunities to advance, albeit, rhetorical principles over expressed
national interests.
Thus, the end of the Cold War as well as the'resolution' of the Iraq-Kuwait
conRict offered one of those !"'<Ire opportunities for countries like the United ·States
to express moral outrage at the hanging death ofPulitzer Prize winning playwright
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Nigerians in November 1995. However, while
international attention was focused on Nigeria following this heinous act by Sani
Abacha's regime, the responses from the international community, especially the
United States and the United Kingdom were mostly muted.
There au several reasons why international attention was focused on
igeria following the Abacha regime's brutal hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight
members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). Nigeria
commands international recognition ~cause of its size, brutal civil war (1967-
1970). and its vast oil and gas reserves. Although a major player in regional and
continental politics, igeria's inRuence remains unstable largely as a result of
domestic political and economic instability. Further, as a result of inadequate
planning. misappropriation of funds and w~steful spending by successive
military/civilian administrations, Nigeria's external debt is well over $30 billion.
Consequent indebtedness to the London and Paris Clubs and other western
institutions that require the lMF's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) as
a condition for further lending and rescheduling of outstanding debts continue
to constrain Nigeria's options to effectively direct its regional and global foreign
economic relations.
Following the hanging death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, some observers of
igerian political economy argued that the absence of major world conRicts
constraining the interests and actions of major states like the U.S. should have
resulted in a focused and principled attention on the igerian government's
disregard of human rights principles and norms. And given that about 10 percent
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of U.S. oil imports l are from Nigeria and with the emphasis on democratization
as a major framework of U.S. global policy under President Clinton, these
observers argued that the United States should have lead the western countries to
impose effective economic sanctions against the Nigerian military government's
anti~human rights actions. One of the rationales for proposing sanctions against
the Abacha administration was the legal process adopted in the trial of the Og01li
Nine. Western and other sympathetic observers saw the process as a gross violation
of human rights and an offense to contemporary civilized culture. Also, the call
for sanctions against the military government of Nigeria was aimed at expressing
western and pro~democracy movements' disapproval of the Babangida-Abacha
administrations' failure to honor its pledge to return Nigeria to a democratic
system ofgovernance in 1993.1he call for economic sanction was also intensified
by the regime's refUsal to heed the Pope's plea that General Sani Abacha2 release
political prisoners after His Holiness' visit to Nigeria in April 1998. While these
events may have been ignored under different international contexts, United
States' Post~Cold~War politics, which was focused on promoting free market
and democratic principles, as well as Nigeria's relative importance in supplying
petroleum to the international community made it difficult fot the major powers
to ignore events in Nigeria, especially following the annulment of Nigeria's 1993
presidential elections.
One of the assumptions of this paper is that within the existing
international system, the foreign policies of major states like the United States are
motivated more by their societal economic needs (n;ttional interest argument) than
me ideological (principle) argument for human rights and democracy. Therefore,
given the Nigerian context, the United States was not likely to lead the international
community to impose costly3 economic sanctions that would change the behavior
of the government if such sanctions have a potential for negative impact on the
uuerests of the U.S. and her allies. Further, the use of economic statecraft such
as «anomie sanctions by one state to influence the political behavior in another
stlte is largely successful if other states cooperate with the sanctioning state(s}
~St the target state. In calling for economic sanctions to be led by the United
Sares against the Abacha regime, a number of advocates of sanctions ignored the
obal economic policy/interests of industrialized and former colonialist states.
This paper examines how economic sanction as an instrument ofstatecraft
mHuenced the outcome of the 1993 transition program in Nigeria. It clarifies the
butorical impact of colonialism and how that experience continues to constrain
the use of traditional strategies of economic sanction to attempt to influence
African governments, especially military governments. It argues that, if economic
9
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sanction as a tool ofstatecraft is to result in regime change. then its efficacy needs
00 be reexamined because of the absence of coherent and sustained imernal
action by indigenous elites that desire an alternative governance structUre from
authoritarianism. Indeed. the paper suggests that in the absence of an imernal
coalition to coumer the impact of authoritarianism within the domestic political
space, especially in the case of Sub·Saharan African countries like Nigeria, it is
almost impossible co identify external interests co enable the initiation of regime
change from the outside. Therefore, economic sanctions are likely to be minimally
supported by western governments, with strong rhetoric in suppOrt of free market
and democratic principles.
Structurally, the paper is divided into four sections. The first section
presents the argument, which explores economic sanction as an instrument of
foreign policy.This is followed byabriefhiscorical accountofNigeria's incorporation
into the international capitalist economic system and how that experience remains
an obstacle to a viable political and economic development in Nigeria. The third
section examines the effectiveness of the a.rgument for economic sanction against
Nigeria. The paper concludes with a discussion of the extent to which economic
sanction against Nigeria affected the transition to civilian rule. .
Economic Sanctions as
Instruments ofForeign Policy
According to Margaret Doxey, economic sanctions are measures taken
unilaterally or multilaterally in response to an unwelcome or unacceptable act
by another government.....• In this paper economic sanction as an instrument of
foreign policy is defined as one state's action(s) aimed positively or negatively at
inRuencing the behavior and therefore the policies ofanother state.SThe economic
effect of sanctions on the Abacha administration (1993·1998) in Nigeria is
therefore analyzed in the context of its impact on that leadership's willingness to
change its behavior in the expected direction. It is assumed here that economic
sanction was a preferred option of inRuence co other means (for example, direct
intervention) for achieving the desired outcome of a more open system ofjudicial
resolurion of political differences in Nigeria. Furthermore, I assume that United
States' StruCtural power6 in the international system at the end of the Cold War is
aimed to promote free market principles and democratic transitions.
Although economic sanction as a tool of foreign policy is a historical fact,
some analysts argue that economic sanctions have not been effective in changing the
behavior of target states.' The United Nations and powerfUl states like the United
'0
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States use economic sanctions in bilateral and multilateral strategies in their efforts
to communicate disapproval of certain actions of other states. For example. the
United Nations imposed economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa, Haiti,
Iraq and the Yugoslav Federation on different occasions. Over the years, sanctions
have been imposed by the unilateral effort of the United States against Cuba, Libya,
icaragua, and Iran, and in the 1990s, limited or partial sanctions were imposed or
threatened against China and Nigeria. In each case, it is arguable the extent to which
the desired. outcome from sanction was realized. However, if we broaden the scope
and goals of decision makers in imposing economic sanctions, it becomes clear that
economic sanctions are used in the same way military interventions are used, i.e.,
for country A to do something she would not ordinarily do for country B, thereby
expressing B's power or influence over A. In that respect, "[n]o other technique of
sGltecraft even begins to approach international trade for effectiveness in promoting
mis important foreign policy goa1:'8 Consequently, ceteris paribus, the United States'
importation of about 50 percent of Nigeria's crude petroleum export (a form of
international economic exchange) becomes a spectacularly important and therefore
effective instrument ofstatecraft for both states to influence decisional outcomes in
me preferred direction.9
Clearly, the target states (which sanctions are expected to reward or
punish) are not all equally affected by the scope of the instruments as well as
me exrent to which each country can sustain and adjust to external pressure for
domestic change. For example, China is more able to adjust to a United States'
sponsored economic sanction against her than could, for example, Cuba. China is
both economically and militarily diversified and has more options for imports and
apons ofgoods and services as well as the ability to defend itselfwithin the Asian
tcglon. On the other hand, Cuba is a much smaller counrry located 90 miles off
the coaSt of the United States, depends on a monocultural economy and is much
weaker in defending itself than China from external threats. Therefore, although
hom countries remain sensitive to external pressure for a change in their domestic
:and enemal policies, Cuba is more vulnerable iO than China and therefore more
V to be negatively affected by economic sanctions ifher friends do not come to
btt ald. Also, the anti,apartheid sanctions against South Africa did not initially lead
dte desired expectation that the white~dominatedSouth African government
would change its policy toward indigenous South Africans. The desired result was
achieved because of the cold war ideological structure that served the interests
the U.S. and those of the now defunct USSR. Consequently, United States'
ClOt support of apartheid in South Africa delayed the impact of the multilateral
w.nctions on South Africa. Supporting the pro-sanction argumenr, some analysts
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have argued mat Chase Manhattan Bank's decision not to roll·over outstanding
short~term loans to South Africa in 198511 and the unexpected termination of me
cold~war in 1989 played a major role in the effectiveness of economic sanctions
against South Africa,12 and me consequent re2lization ofa democratic government
based on one~person~one~votein April 1994.
The effectiveness ofeconomic sanctions in South Africa was also a function
of Soum Africa's economic dependence on foreign markets for its exports. In
the case of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Johan Galrung argues mat the more a
country's economy depends on the export of one product to a specific trading
parmer or block of partners, the more vulnerable such a country becomes if its
trading parmers decide to use economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign
policy against itY Galcung's argument is premised on the assumption that the
sanction~sponsoringstate is indeed willing and capable of applying sanction on
the product(s) that the target state is dependent on for its economic well~being.
In the case of Nigeria, for example, effective economic sanction would
mean that (a) the Abacha regime did not have viable alternative that would enable
it to survive sanction on Nigeria's export of crude petroleum; (b) mat the cost of
imposing economic sanctions on Nigeria to the United States and her allies are at
an acceptable level; (c) therefore, me United Scates and her allies would actually
take the decision to embargo Nigeria's expon ofcrude petroleum until the Abacha
regime agreed to the principles of economic and political liberalism as desired
by the sponsoring states. Effective economic sanction is also premised on states'
ability and wiUingness to control the behavior of Transnational Corporations
(TNC's) whose economic interests sometimes are at odds with those of their
home states. 14 For example, the executives and lobbyists for Shell, Chevron and
other oil companies tried to persuade Washington that economic sanctions
against Nigeria would hurt the Nigerian masses more than it would the Abacha
regime. Also, given the massive anti~sanction campaign in the U.S, and the general
lethargy about Africa by Americans, the extent to which public opinion will rise
in suppOrt of economic sanctions against Nigeria was questionable. However,
with its professed support for multilateralism and the principles of economic and
political liberalism in the world, the Clinton administration could not ignore the
grave impact that "doing nothing" would have on pro-democracy movemenrs and
human rights activists across Africa, especially in Nigeria.
In that situation, the oil companies were relevant instruments ofeconomic
statecraft because the drilling of crude petroleum and its transportation to the
west was largely carried our by the T Cs, as remains the case, and therefore,
sanctions that affect the oil sector would affect the profits of the oil companies.
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In addition to the oil companies, the Commonwealth of Nations was relevant if
effective economic sanction was to be imposed against Abacha's regime. As Klaus
Knorr argues, the logic of economic sanctions "prescribes that the enemy suffer a
maximum reduction of his economic base relative to one's own •.. one's own costs
must be taken into account:'15 Given the geographic location of Nigeria and the
potential difficulty ofother credible instrument offoreign policy, especially military
intervention, the COSt of"doing nothing" was hoth political and psychological for
the u.s."Doing nothing" would have questioned U.S. commitment to protecting
human rights and promoting democracy in the world at the end of the Cold~War.
Psychologically,"doing nothing" entailed demoralizing those in the trenches across
the third world who had accepred Washington's battle cry against autocracy,
ecological and human rights violations.
In the long run, such neglect would have resulted in U.S. intervention on
a humanitarian basis which (though it has not proven effective as illustrated in the
cases ofSomalia, Rwanda and Zaire) will tend to be more costly both economically
and in terms of human lives and therefore further erode outside credibiliry
about Washington's commitment to human rights, democracy and capitalism in
Africa. Given that the effectiveness of e.conomic sanctions tend to depend on the
.availability ofalternatives for the rarget states and the costs to the sponsoring state,
cooperation by ideologically similar states and their level of commitment to use
economic sanctions to inRuence the behavior of the target state is a necessary, but
DOt sufficient condition for an effective outcome, especially against a peripheral
.and undeveloped state like Nigeria. Thus, a historictl explanation that emphasizes
me need for caution provides a lens to see how effective economic sanction on
AMcha's regime, which presided over an intense case of politicized ethnicity, class
.and religion, would have been, especially in a situation where both the process and
mntent of foreign economic policy was the life~line of the regime.
'3
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Post-colonial Politics
and the Nigeria Statel6
As a juridical territory created by the British in 1914, Nigeria remains an
ethnically contested stateY Generally, it is argued that by integrating the
Northern and Southern Protectorates into one, Britain undemocratically created
the geographical entity known as Nigeria. This amalgamation resulted in various
acts of resistance characterized by appeals to primordial interests that reached
their highest peak in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). While Britain cannot be
absolved from its imperialism and social exploitation of many countries including
Nigeria, Nigerianists have not fully explored and articulated all the explanatory
reasons for the invariable lack of respect and indifference to the legitimacy of the
state in Nigeria that seem to run along ethnic lines. The fact is that, individually
and collectively, Nigerians have tended not to have allegiance to the nation-
state imposed by the Briti;h. On an abstract level, Nigerians identify with the
geographical entity mapped out by the British, but, in practice seem unable or
unwilling to associate with the idea of Nigeria. Perhaps the key reason is that the
Foullding Fathers of Nigeria are foreigners and there has not arisen an indigenous
elite group in Nigeria to map out what should constitute a Nigerian culture as
a basis for nationalism. Hence, most Nigerians, irrespective of their nationalist
claims, have the tendency to first identify with their ancestral roots before
identifying themselves as Nigerians.
Some Nigerians, of course, seek to overcome that divisive heritage as
exemplified by an analyst at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs who
complained that civil servants are required to indicate their state and ethnic
origins on a Federal form for identification purposes.18 More typical, however,
is the following statement by Ebenezer Babatope (Minister of Transport and
Aviation in Abacha's regime):
... And if people think that because I am a minister that I have
forgotten the fact that one, I'm an Ileshaman, twO, I'm an Ijeshaman,
and third, I'm a Yorubaman, then fourth, I am a Nigerian citizen, then
such people should really go and examine themselves. I cannot divorce
myself from the yearning and aspirations of the people of my roots.19
Babatope is not the first highly placed Nigerian to articulate his need to be
first identified with his ethnic group. Those who argue that Britain is responsible
for emphasizing ethnic separatism in Nigeria would find evidence in Her Majesty's
Governor to Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford's address to the Nigerian Council on
December 29,1920 when he argued that "".a deadly blow would [have been] ...
'4
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struck at the very root of national self-government in Nigeria which secures to
each separate people the right ro maintain its identity, its individuality and its
narionality... :'20 Clearly, Governor Clifford was speaking for and on behalf of the
Imperial government in England. Britain's need for administrative consolidation
as a strategy for cutting costs while increasing revenues trom Nigeria necessitated
the imperialists' divide-and~conquer policies in the infamous "indirect rule"
strategy which emphasized ethnic separatism among various groups in Nigeria,
but especially between the Northern Hausa-Fulani and the various Kingdoms
in the Southern portion of the country. But, it is significant to note that Britain
did not create ethnicity in Nigeria. Rather, British colonization and control of the
political economy within Nigerian resulted in ethnic rigidification whose effects
remain evident in contemporary Nigerian politics.
For example, the leader of the Nig{rian People's Congress (NPC), the
late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, dur+g the Constitutional Conference in
1948, stated that: "Since the amalgamation. of the north and the south provinces
in 1914, Nigeria had existed as one countr0~aper.... It is still far from being
united. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for~the counrry:'21 Conceptually,
the leader of the Action Group, the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo also argued
in 1947 that, "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographic expression. There
are not 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English,"Welsh: or'French'. The
word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live
within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not:'22
Thus. while the founding fathers of Nigeria established for themselves
a congruenr relationship between their own nation and the newly created state,
the idea of state was imposed on the several nations within the geographical
territory called Nigeria. While the founding fathers of Nigeria's eventual political
independence from Britain articulated and resented the idea of Nigerian unity,
these "nationalists" were enticed by the political imaginations and control of the
instrument of power offered by the western imposed state. But the nationalists
accepted the new state structures as a framework for constructing economic
growth and political stability for uniting the polity to transcend their ethnic
loyalties, and therefore authenticate the new nation, and legitimize the authority
of its new narionalleadership.
As Sheth argues. those third world leaders who accepted the western state
model largely interpreted the problem of ethnicity as a larger problem emanating
from nation building. Consequently, they sought to reconcile the centrifugal
forces of ethnicity with nationhood by assigning the state the central role of
narion-building. However, according to Sheth, the Peace of Westphalia ended all
'5
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ambiguities in the status of existing nation~states in Europe by establishing the
principle of territorial existence for emerging societies in the face of conflicting
but overlapping religious and denominational identities of the peoples.23
In essence, then, the start as originally established in Europe was the center
of social relations, which enforced allegiance to natioPlal identity above religious
loyalty. The organizational structure of the state therefore made it possible for
the state to act as a unifying facror for national integration and development
through the establishment of national institutions such as the civil service and
academic and industrial found.ations for the development of the country. "Such
a state [is] not merely the means of keeping political order within the national
society:'24 its survival depends on the st.ate's c.apacity to accommodate the creation
and maintenance of civil society, viable educational and scientific institutions, as
well as providing a platform that encourages all its citizens to participate in the
project of building and sustaining their state.
While the state performs its function as a platform for integration, it paves
the w.ay for all citizens --irrespective ofethnic or religious identities - to participate
in the process of nation~buildingwithout obst.acIes. In the process, the state will
demand the highest quality of input from its citizens by institutionalizing the
concept ofmerit as a criterion for employment, which ensures th.at competent and
qualified citizens are .attr.tcted .and retained to serve the national interest without
undermining the integrity of the citizens' humanity-irrespective of capabilities.
For Nigeria, the state as one of the legacies of colonialism, is a non-
hegemonic entity unlike its western counterpart that enjoys both abstr.tcr and real
stature, with the capacity to affect citizens, domestic and external policies, and
the ability to promote cohesion .and unity among its constituent parts. Nigerian
politicians and military generals have demonstr.tted time and again that rather
than a unifying platform for a diversity ofpeoples, the Nigerian state is a contested
framework for wealth accumulation. In this respect, neoliberal viewpoints that
states like Nigeria require further integration into the international capitalist
economic system to ensure sustained economic growth and therefore a more
peaceful coexistence of the polities that make~upNigeria requires reevaluation. If
anything. Nigeria does not inherently lack capitalism and democracy per Sf; it has
both in excess, but lacks transparent, competent and benevolent leadership and
industrialization. Rather, capitalism, which is inherently anti-political freedom,
especially freedom of the state to constrain capitalist methods of accumulation
has found a fertile gr ound in Nigeria because the state is weak and incapable
of protecting its own interests against domestic and international capitalism.
As a result, the weak Nigerian state becomes a free·for·all forum for sectional
,6
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exploitation, class and ethnic fragmentation, collusion between government
officials and foreign and domestic business executives. It is this corporatization
of Nigeria that made the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Ogoni
agitators rossible. In a fragmented society with disorganized labor and student
unions, the Leviathan easily defeats civil rights and civilliberry organizations.And,
as long as corporate profits and personal/class wealth accumulation continues,
arguments based on moral principles are checkmated by realpolitik. According to
Robert Heilbroner,
The normal relation ofcapiral to state power is rherefore pragmatic,
gladly accept~ng the use of military, bureaucratic, legislative, or other
stare intervenrions when they favor accumulation, resisting them when
they do not. To put it differently, capitalists have no interests as capitalists
in promoting the cause of freedom. They are indeed more likely to have
opposed interests, insofar as freedom may create subversive attitudes
toward the regime ofcapital....25
In this regard, the 1995 hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa that drew severe
international condemnation was an act that made it possible for a grotesque
mediocrity of international capitalists and human rights advocates to play the
hero's part. Consequently, rather than promote the general welfare of all people,
Multinational Corporations continued to maintain alliances with the foster and
extractive elites in Nigeria at the expense of the masses. The suffocation of civil
society and the glaring envitonmental devastation that Shell has been associated
with in Nigeria is simply toO obvious to repudiate.26 However, the hanging of
the Ogolli Nine was also a consequence of the internal arrangement of power and
the nature of economic production that tends to rely solely on oil for the design,
development and maintenance of the Nigerian political, economic and social
experience. The current economic and political Crises under President Obasanjo
are rooted in the history of the initial political and economic design introduced
by the British, which so far remain unchallenged by Nigeria's indigenous leaders.
That design suPPOrtS governmental strucrures like the Abacha's regime and
President Obasanjo's civilian administration, which does not find human rights
violations, extra-legal measures of dealing with opposition and a transition to and
consolidation ofa constitutional democratic government salient to its existence. To
the extent that such regimes do not find these issues salient, the threat of economic
sanctions or actual impositions of sanctions for their behaviors will not result in
a change of policy or a viable process for democratic transition and consolidation.
The political instability in the country since independence is a consequence of this
'7
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indifference to the nature of the nation, which Nigerians inherited from colonialist
practice in exchange for individual and ethnic rights and freedoms.
The Nigerian civil war resulted in the internal rearrangemenr of power
and brought [0 the forefront a coalition of the northern oligarchy and the southern
and middle belt civilian predators, in alliance with army generals as a ruling class
which has demonstrated its disregard for the peasants, political and human rights
and a general lack of commitment to economic development in Nigeria. While
the civil war, the various coups and counter~coups in Nigeria, religious riots and
demonstrations continue to claim the lives of millions of Nigerians; there persists
a glaring absence of international mobilization against successive repressive
regimes in Nigeria. The hanging of Saro~Wiwa and his compatriots attracted
some reaction because western governments and institutions felt slighted by the
Abacha regime's indifference to all threats and pleas for clemency.
The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other members of the Movement
for the Survival of Ogof,i People (MOSOP) can only be understood as a symptom
of twO related dilemmas that the ruling coalition faced in Nigeria. First, given the
fact that the Abacha government lacked legitimacy with the citizenry and had to
resore to the use of force to govern, any indication of weakness would only have
encouraged younger military officers to overthrow the government. Secondly,
given mat "oil is everything" in Nigeria and that the ruling coalition failed in the
implementation of its Machiavellian strategies to further fragment the various
ethnic groups, especially in the oil producing areas of the Delta region, the regime
left itselfwith no option but to discourage any type of minority or broad coalitions
against the government by hanging the Ogoll; Ni"e as an example to alL A lack of
concern about the regime's image abroad or the condition of the masses in Nigeria
was also demonstrated by the murder of Kudirat Abiola, the prison death of
Shehu Yar'Adua, political imprisonment of several Nigerians, and trial and death
sentences for Oladipo Diya and other alleged coup plotters. The most salient issue
to the regime was oil revenue, and as long as Nigerian oil revenue continued to be
deposited in the banks by the multinational oil corporations like Shell, Chevron
and Mobile, the regime saw no need to change its behavior.
The externally weak state had to prove to Shell and other multinational
corporations "how stable" the Nigerian environment is to capitalist ventures.
However, as a largely non-hegemonic structure lacking an internal legitimizing
mechanism and whose economic policies are largely based on 90 percent oil
revenue, the Nigerian economy is both sensitive and vulnerable to external market
fluctuations. Furehermore. it consistently failed to address the internal conditions
mat resulted in the neglect of agricultural production, the major income
,. 12
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revenue for the majority of Nigerian citizens before the civil war. The current
monocultural nature of the Nigerian political economy has led to a situation in
which even decisions for the location of industries are based on political rather
than economic logic. A predictable consequence of politicized logic within the
state is the infliction of physical violence against citizens. Such violence, inherent
to the original colonialist design to divjde~and~conquer,encourages Nigeria's
underdevelopment by an indigenous ruling class through blatant corruption and
abuse of state powers,27 It is a design that needs to be consistently challenged
by international and domestic coalitions interested in the restoration of stable
political institutions in Nigeria. Referring to the politically driven decisions for
the location of industries, the former governor of Kaduna state, and a member of
the ruling coalition from the north in 1982, observed that:
Instead ofa democracy in which you have in operation, government
for the people, by the people, and of the people, you have a contraetocracy
in which government is for contracrors, by contractors and of
contractors. Politics is being reduced to a fight between ... gang[s]
of greedy tycoons, each backed by their foreign business masters and
others: and each waving some tribal or sectional banner to confuse arid
divide our people.28
By manipulating ethnic, religious and sectional sensitivities, the ruling coalition
continued to articulate its specific interests. This is usually manifested in terms
of embezzlement of public funds rather than the -extent to which public funds
can be re~invested to further national economic development. As each successive
ruling coalition's expertise in awarding contracts developed, based on what cash
benefits such contracts held for them as state officials, it became increasingly easy
to ignore fundamental questions such ~s: What is the narure of the product that
Nigeria is investing in~ What exactly is Nigeria producing~To what extent are the
projects viable~ How can the contractors' and products' efficiency and relevance for
Nigeria be evaluated~ Questions like the above have largely remained irrelevant
since independence because each coalition's interest has been vesred in its own
internal dynamics rather than on national economic development. Consequently,
the difficulty or indifference regarding the articulation of policies that serves the
interests of the general welfare has persisted.
Although the Nigerian state is relatively weak to states outside its borders
and strong at the domestic level, it remains incapable of providing for the cohesion
and unity of the complex social formations inherited at independence. For the new
nation at independence, the only organized institution or class was the inherited
13
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colonial British-style military, which lacked respect for civil society and democracy.
However, because it was the mOSt powerful means at itS disposal the POSt-
independence leadership used the military to protect and promote the interestS of
its members, ignoring and suppressing the interestS of those it defined as radicals
or "enemies" of the State. Exploring issues that were salient for the Abacha regime
and how it defined its "enemies" and "friends," will enhance our understanding of
the extent to which economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy could
have been effective in changing chat regime's behavior. The next section examines
the effectiveness of the argumentS for economic sanction as a foreign ·policy tool that
inAuenced the politics of transition in Nigeria under Abacha.
Economic Sanctions and
Transition Politics in Nigeria
Analyzing economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy, Morgan and
Schwebach argue that economic sanctions generally tend to be an ineffective
instrument of foreign policy. The authors however assert that under certain
conditions economic sanctions could be effective.
When the sanctions are costly to politically powerful segments of
sodery, who are relatively unconcerned abour me issue under dispute,
and whose preferences on the issues diverge considerably from those
of me sanctioner. sanctions can produce a large effect on the target's
policies.29
Further, Morgan and Schwebach state that although sanctions tend to
be costly to the regime in the target state, "in some absolute sense" relative to the
"value of the issues at stake;' such sanctions are not costly to the political aCtors in
the target state. The authors assert that "{ t]he powerful political actors (generaUy
the military) did not violate the rights of the citizenry simply for the sake of doing
so. Rather, the rights violations were seen as an essential means for maintaining
political power."30 For such a regime, holding on to power becomes the most
desired outcome and the most salient issue for which the regime in the target state
is willing to pay severe economic COStS, thereby rendering sanctions ineffective.
For Nigeria, the salient issue for the Abacha regime was not so much
international humiliation or ostracism but the possibility of losing political power
and therefore the loss of control of the Nigerian state by the regime, which was
dominated by Hausa~Fulani ethnic groups. Given that for the regime, the state was
a framework for wealth accumulation; its control was preferred to any accolades that,. 14
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could have come from international groups such as Human Rights Watch,Amnesty
International, and other international and domestic pro~democracygroups.
Besides, the control of the Nigerian state was not merely of interest to
the Abacha's regime; it was of interest to the predatory/extracrive elites, northern
oligarchy and the military cabals that formed the ruling coalition since Nigeria's
independence. For example, since political independence in 1960, the Hausa-
Fulani as a group has ruled Nigeria approximately 35 of her 44 years since
independence, while the Yoruba as a group has ruled for 8 of the 44 years and the
Igbo as a group ruled for only 1 year (or seven months to be precise). It is equally
significant to note that out of the 44 years since independence, the military as a
class has Fuled Nigeria 29 of the last 44 years. Olusegun Obasanj0 31 has ruled
both as a military officer and now as a civilian head of state following the Abacha/
Abubakar32 1999 transition. The foregoing is important because the major states
(U.S. and U.K.) have consistently from independence, preferred stability and
order to constitutional democracy in Nigeria, and have thus preferred to deal with
the autocrats that have ruled Nigeria without regard to the masses. Therefore,
these major states have remained reluctant to impose any serious sanctions on
successive regimes in Nigeria-preferring rhetorical support for democracy and
transparency than performance. And, while this knowledge was not lost on the
Abacha administration, the domestic prodemocracy movement's reliance on the
international community to aid its cause was sorely disappointed as the hanging
death of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other members of MOSOP was merely greeted
with rhetorical condemnations while Abacha and his cronies continued to enjoy the
revenue from crude petroleum exports by Shell, Chevron and other companies.
And, with the 1999 transition from military autocracy to civilian
administration, many observers had hoped that President Obasanjo's experience
as a former political prisoner under the Abacha regime would lead him to
institutionalize a liberal constitutional democracy such that the extra~judicial
methods of conflict resolution under Abacha would give way to a constitutionally
transparent protection of citizens' civil rights and liberties. As any astute observer
of Nigerian politics can attest, the political strucmre necessary for sociopolitical
stability as a condition for economic growth within the framework of liberal
constimtionalism has yet to materialize in Nigeria. In fact, despite of the
overwhelming evidence of instability and state~implicated violations ofcivil rights
and liberties in Bayelsa, Anambra, Delta, and Plateau states, no international
outrage is evident because there is no direct threat to the interests of the United
States, France or Great Britain.
However, even if the international community were to have decided that
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economic sanction against the Abacha regime was a preferred tool for expressing
its outrage of the regime's violations of human rights, the question is: what would
the Abacha regime have gained by changing its behavior in the preferred direction~
How would the ruling coalition composed of predatory extractive elites, army
generals and oligarchs from the Hausa,Fulani ethnic group benefit from changing
its behavior and policy in the direction suggested by the pro,sanction argument~
Were the arguments for imposing economic sanctions based on a realistic
assessment of the issues that were most salient to the ruling oligarchy~ Even if
such salient issues were identified, how effective would consequent economic
sanctions have been~ Specifically for the United States, would economic sanctions
have had the desired outcome~
A careful analysis ofthe dynamics of igeria's domestic politics is essential
to determining the significant variables necessary for assessing the effectiveness of
sanctions. In hanging the Ogo;)i Niue, theAbacha regime showed that it had nothing
to lose-politically and diplomatically-within the international community.
The hanging of the Ogo,,; NitJe was a classical Machiavellian political strategy of.
dealing with those the regime considered its "enemies:' At the domestic level, the
hanging effectively served to frighten, fragment and disorganize opposition groups
that could have mobilized against the regime. As a result, and unarguably, the
absence of an effective domestic opposition led the external team of human rights
delegations from the Commonwealth ofNations that went to investigate Abacha's
regime to conclude that further sanctions against Nigeria should be deferred in
preference of some form of political transition.33
The Commonwealth of Nations' decision to defer the imposition of
economic sanctions consequendy left the United States with the burden of
sponsoring economic sanctions against the Abacha regime. For economic
sanctions to be effective, the saliency of the issues to the political actors in the
target state as well as the COStS and alternatives forgone for the sponsoring state(s)
has to be part of the calculus. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in 1995. Ambassador Moose acknowledged the complexity of the
Nigerian situation detailing U.S. interests and how those interests could serve as
a basis for influencing the behavior of the military regime in Nigeria.}4 According
to Ambassador Moose, due to the size and regional importance of Nigeria, U.S.
interests in the COUntry were necessarily diverse. The main U.S. interest was
identified as~a stable, democratic Nigeria" amenable to productive and cooperative
relations. Ambassador Moose testified that the U.S. has "significant economic
interests in Nigeria, with $3.9 billion invested mainly in the petroleum sector;'
and "a specific interest in curbing narcotics trafficking"35 by Nigerians.
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Given the specified interests of the United States in Nigeria and its
disapproval of the hanging of Ken Saro~Wiwa and the other members of
MOSOP, the aborted return to a democratic system of governance in 1993 and
the continuous incarceration and fractionalization of some pro-democracy and
labor union activists at that time,36 some options that were open to the US.
included: (a) verbal condemnation of the military regime's policies. This would
have been symbolic rhetoric not aimed at changing the behavior of the regime. (b)
The US. could simply have done nothing. Given that both Chevron and Mobil
are US.~based oil companies and that Nigeria's crude petroleum is largely refined
in New Jersey, it would seem that America's more tangible and specific interest
was not threatened. In the eyes of pro~democracyand human rights activists it
became particeps crimitJis.37 (c) The third option was to do something beyond
rhetorical expression of displeasure at what some analysts have called"outrageous
behavior" by the ruling oligarchy and their gatekeepers in Abuja. Ambassador
Moose's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggested that
the US. chose the third option and consequently
• canceled $11 million in assistance ro Nigeria's Ministry of Health,
• terminated development assistance, except for humanitarian aid,
• ended government to government military assistance, except for
counternarcotics-related rraining,
• instituted a case~by~case review for all new license applications for
commercial export of defense articles and services to Nigeria.
• [Further, the U.S.] ... requested the withdrawal ofthe Nigerian military
attache from the US.,
• withdrew irs Security Assistance Officer, and suspended travel to
Nigeria by the new Defense Attache. [And, finally, under Section
21Z-(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,] ... the Clinton
administration issued a proclamation that restricted the entry into the
u.s. by Nigerians who formulated, implemented or benefited from
policies [that] hindered Nigeria's transition to democracy, as well as
members of their immediate families. 38
For a number of reasons, the above measures were not effective as instruments
of foreign policy against the Abacha regime. The measures did nor target the
salient issue for the regime ~~ staying in power at all costs. Thus, the cancellation
of $11 million assistance to the Ministry of Health or the ending of government
to government assistance and denial ofentry visas for the regime and their families
were measures that could attract a small country without petrodollars. Thus, while
'3
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the content of the policy suggested that the Clinton adminisrration was "doing
something," it grossly underesrimaced the policy outcome and therefore paid
more attention to the process rather than the coment that sends the message.
The predatory/extractive elites' alliance with the military officers who benefited
directly from the lack ofaccountability in oil revenues showed the military regime's
rational choice approach based on its decision to play the game simultaneously at
two~levels39- the domestic and the international diplomatic levels.
At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences
of foreign developments, especially in their relationship with important allies.
Similarly. at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies tmd politicians or army
gener.l1.s seek power by constructing coalitions among the various economic and
political groups. As Putnam argues, "neither of the twO games can be ignored
by central decision~makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent,
yet sovereign."40 Assuming a two-person game or coalitions (for instance, the
Abacha regime versus the Clinton administration on behalf of pro-sanction
groups), each negotiator or decision~maker sits at both game boards. Across the
international table sits his foreign counterpart, and across from the domestic table
sits representatives of various domestic coalitions and advisors. Although, moves
that are rational at One game board (for example, releasing all political prisoners
and disbanding all political activities and thereby allowing Moshood Abiola,
the presumed winner of the 1992 election, who was subsequently imprisoned
by the Abacha regime. to claim his mandate which will tend to please the pro~
sanction domestic and international groups) may be unwise for the same player
ar the (domestic) board where those who are likely to be negatively affected by
a democratic and accountable civilian government will mobilize in opposition
and potentially delay and/or prevent the implementarion of the transition to
democracy program. According to Putnam, "there are powerful incentives for
consistency, and ultimately differences in rhetoric between the twO rabies may be
tolerated:'41 But in the end, either political prisoners are released and democratic
transition takes place or, the regime will further consolidate its hold on power in
spite of sanctions. While the latter was the case for Nigeria, there are political
and economic COSts, which· wiD tend to factor into the final decision. Ultimately,
the interests of the dominant economic and political coalitions clearly featured in
their preferred policy implementation.
Consistent with the two-level game metaphor, the Abacha regime, even
though it could not negotiate directly with Washington, still behaved as if it sat
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at the bargaining table to persuade the Clinton administration against effective
economic sanction on Nigeria. For example, aware that Nigeria supplies about
600,000 barrels of crude petroleum a day to the United States,42 and that two
major oil companies - Mobil and Chevron are based in the United States, the
regime set out to use the effective lobbying structure permitted within the United
States' democratic system ofgovernance to persuade the Clinton administration of
the potential costs Americans will suffer if sanction was imposed against Nigeria.
However, Frankel reported that after the hanging of the Ogoni Nine and the threat
of punitive sanctions seemed to gather support,
Nigeria fought back.The [Abuja1Governmentemployed theservices
of nine U.S. public relations and lobbying firms spanning the American
political spectrum. Among them were the law firm of Washington &
Christian, run by liberal black Democrats, which reported receiving
$600,000 ftom Nigeria for the first six months of the year, and Symms,
Lehn & Associates, an Alexandria firm headed by former Idaho senator
Steve Symms (R) and Alfred Lehn, formet aide to Bob Dole, which
reported receiving about $300,000Y
Beyond the retention of lobbying firms, arguably the Kassebaum-Payne
bills aimed at severe economic sanctions including, possibly, oil embargo did not
come to a vote in either house because of the effective strategy of coalition politics
employed by the oil companies and the Abacha regime. The bill failed to come
to a vote because of the lobbying': .. effort by major oil companies such as Mobil
Oil, Amoco and Chevron, as well as several non-oil firms with involvement in
a $3.8 billion liquehed natural gas project in southeastern Nigeria:'44 Equally
significant was the lobbying by the 107 members of the Corporate Council on
Africa who were reported to have received $10,000.00 each to lobby Washington
against economic sanctions.45 Given how important campaign contributions are
to elections and re-e1ections in the United States, the lobbying efforts by the
Abacha regime who used the oil companies and lobbying hrms to represent it
at the international bargaining table outmaneuvered the pro-sanction and pro-
democracy groups, at home and abroad.
At the domestic table, the game was simple and effective. The government
resorted to suffocating civil society, arresting and imprisoning journalists, union
leaders, pro-democracy groups, students and members of academic staff unions.
And, in response to what appeared to be random acts ofviolence, the regime charged
the Nobel Laureate Wale Soyinka and other critics ofthe government with treason.
Consequently, a reasonable number ofeducated Nigerians Red the country, were in
19
Kalu: The International Dimension of Regime Change: Economic Sanctions
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2006
AFRiCAN SOCIAL SCIENCES REVEIW, VOLUME 3 C3}. FALL :J,006
prison and/or simply resorted to sdf~imposed cocoons ofsilence and indifference
for selrpreservation. The effectiveness of the junta's control of the domestic game
board was further illustrated by the imprisonment of prominent Nigerians that
Abacha considered a threat to his regime. For example, former military head of
sute, Olusegun Obasanjo, the winner of the 1993 presidential election Chief
Moshood Abiola and General Shehu Yar' Adua among others were imprisoned
for alleged rreasonable offences. Indeed, the Abacha regime so intimidated the
domestic opposition groups that Shehu Yar' Adua's prison death occurred without
much serious protest by anyone in Nigeria. Similarly, the regime intimidated,
fragmented and/or co-opted the leadership of the Nigerian Labor Union, the
National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the
Petroleum and the aturaI Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN) into
complacency. Also, the junta effectively silenced and seriously weakened various
pro-democracy groups such as the Academic Staff Union of Universities and the
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS). To further consolidate its
power under Abubakar, the ruling coalition arrested a number of pro-democracy
demonstrators marking the fifth anniversary ofJune 12, including the wife of then
jailed ChiefM. K. O. Abiola. And with the sudden death ofAbacha in mid-1998,
ChiefAbiola also died later in prison under suspicious circumstances.
Thus, the issues that the external pro-sanction camps identified were not salient
to the military regime and the northern oligarchy. Likewise, thestrategies ofconsulting
with allies to allow for a multilateral approach to sanctions against Nigeria was not
effective because the ruling coalition had the money to make economic sanctions
seemingly more cosdy for the sponsoring sUtes, but especially for the U.S. On its
parr, the U.S. had the option of military imervemioll - a foreign policy instrument
the U.S. has neither the economic nor the security interests to employ in the case of
igeria or other sub~Sahar.mAfrican States. Thus, U.S.-sponsored sanction against
Nigeria was a rhetorical foreign policy decision based on moral principles designed
to support international nOnTIS and values governing human rights. This rhetorical
device remains the U.S. modus operandi as evident in the case of U.S.-identified
genocide in Darfur region of Sudan without triggering the necessary intemational
action as required by the United Nations Genocide Conventions.
Contrary to Ambassador Moose's testimony;. the more specific interest of
supporting the economic interests ofU.S. corporations and other domestic coalitions
was more persuasive an influence on U.S. relationship with Nigeria than the stated
interest of a democratic and an open political system of governance in Nigeria.
The foregoing assertions are based on simple geopolitical logic. The U.S. was not a
colonizer in Africa and the region is not within its geopolitical sphere of influence,
,6
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and thus, has limited (oil) interest in the West African region. Also, she currendy
does not have a great number of its citizens going to Nigeria either for investments
or for tourism. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy in the region is largely based on
a multilateral consultation with Britain and France whose economic and security
interests are more evident.46 As a result, there is no direct basis Jor U.S. influence
attempt in Nigeria that does not COSt Washington more than the target regime.
Generally, U.S. public opinion has been influential in supporting humanitarian
missions into Africa, and economic sanctions do not qualify. Consequently, the rwo~
level games played by Washington maintains balance between the economic interests
of the powerful and influential oil corporations in the U.S. and its professed global
support for liberal democracy and free market economy. When a well constituted
domestic coalition objects to economic sanctions or support of a foreign regime,
as was the Nigerian case, Washington can be expected to project a more realistic
foreign policy devoid ofglobal idealism.
Conclusion:
Assessment of the Impact ofSanctions
The punitive sanctions threatened by the international community after the
halting of the democratic transition program in 1993 and the hanging of the
Ogoni Nille in 1995 were as solid as a hot air balloon in a tornado. As argued
above, the most salient issue for the ruling coalition was staying in power for
the interest of army generals in alliance with predatory/extraceive elite coalition.
The misidentification of the salient issue for the Abacha regime was consistent
with the realist foreign economic policies of the United States and her western
allies towards sub~SaharanAfrican states. However, for the pro~sanctiongroups,
the prize was the vast revenue from crude petroleum, which coincided with the
economic interests of the oil companies. Thus, while most internal pro-democracy
movements and pro~sanctiongroups considered oil embargo a punitive measure
against the military regime, the external constituency consistent with their
economic interests in Nigeria's crude petroleum preferred caution.
Although, Nigerian opposition groups perceived oil embargo as a mechanism
that would have crippled the regime, the Corporate Council on Africa's views that
the concentration of wealth is already in the hands of the few and therefore can
only be further concentrated, led to the suggestion that oil embargo would be
ineffective in changing the behavior of the regime. In the long run, the external
constituency hoped that the regime could become unable to pay its loyal foot
soldiers and would either su.ffer internal dissension and complete break down or
27
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bargain for a more inclusive and open governing system that is aa:ouna.ble to
the citizens. However. with the sudden death of General Abacha In 199 . me
expectations of both the internal and international pro~sanction and democracy
movements were checkmated by General Abubakar's commitment ro unplement
the fraudulent transition program to its fullest. The contrived trarwDOn politics
resulted in the release from prison, election and assumption of office by retired
General Olusegun Obasanjo to the Presidency on May 29, 1999.
Indeed, jt is not clear that the u.s. and its allies have adequ..au: economic
or security inteiests in Nigeiia to impose economic sanctions on a ru::aJ.citr.mt
iegime bent on implementing an authoritarian governance style. espeo.ally ifsuch
autocracy were to occur within a democratic political system. Also. me United
States has yet to make a major foreign policy decision towards Nigeria Oi any
African COuntiY without consultation with Britain and France. bom of whom
have vested economic interests in Nigeria and are therefore more reluctant co
support policies thac do not advance their interests. From that standpoint, the
Commonwealth of Nations, led by Britain, voted to defer sanctions on ligeria
before any realistic evidence ofdemocratic transition was in place.
Thirdly; United States' foreign economic policies have remained. consistent
from Latin America to Asia and Africa. Especially in Cential and Southern Africa,
the economic interests of U.S. corporations have consistently taken precedence
over global idealism, especially, at the end of the Cold War. ConsiStent with
corporate U.S. interests in Africa, the Clinton administration was aware that:
Twency percent of U.S. oil imporrs come from Africa, and Ammo
relies on Afrial. for supplies of strategic miner.tls. Africa possesses 54
percent of the world's cobalt, 32 percmt of its bauxite, 52 percent of
its manganese. and 81 percent of its chromium stocks.... [And] that
American investors are finding Africa highly profitable: the average annual
return on the book value of U.S. investments in Africa in the 1990s was
over 25 petcent, compared to less than 10 percent woridwideY
Therefore. given the size and importance of Nigeria in Africa in general and
specifically in the West African tegion, Washington was unlikely to impose effective
economic sanctions chat would have crippled the Abacha regime and the ruling
coalition. To do so would seriously havt undtrmined western economic interests
and the scabifity of che region \Vich consequtnces far beyond the WtSt African
region. In that respect, the Nigerian pro~dtmocracy movements in the United
States and ocher western countries learned a useful realpolitik lesson on the values
the western governments place on global principles and national interests. When
,8
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the twO collide, national interests take precedence over global principles as evident
in Sudan and other areas in Africa.
Similarly, the history of political leadership in Nigeria since independence
suggests another lesson for both the Nigerian pro-democracy movement overseas
and their external supporters, As demonstrated by the historical account above,
Nigerian politics is fraught with ethnic, religious and class biases. The ethnic
imperative in Nigerian politics is complicated by the alliance between the Hausa-
Fulani ethnic groups, southern predatory elites and the army generals that have
ruled for most of the country's political independence. One ·obvious impact of
me ruling coalition on ordinary Nigerians is evident in the docility of the masses
whose solution to their problem has been largely self~imposed silence and/or
indifference. To the extent that the majority of Nigerians find the state irrelevant
co their daily lives and have chosen isolation over involvement, externally
sponsored economic sanctions on an undemocratic regime will not have a serious
Impact on the Nigerian masses. Thus, while external suppOrt is necessary for
resolVing the political and economic crises in Nigeria, effective and sustainable
efforts must originate from integrated and sustained internal action. External
support of foreign governments, NGOs and other interested organizations
em only enhance such action to restructure, build and sustain an effective civil
society that is capable of ensuring a consolidated liberal democracy in Nigeria.
Indeed, while the authoritarian policies of the late Abacha and his collaborators
led to the formation of various domestic prodemocracy coalitions (NADECO,
UAD, CD, UDFN, GNNO and NDM) in Nigeria, it is dear that undemocratic
governments, especially military regimes are less likely to be overthrown by
.appeals to external constituencies without sustained internal efforts. On their
part, the Nigerian democracy movements were mistaken in their reliance on the
goodwill of international actors without first building a strong domestic coalition.
The ineffectiveness of such goodwill in the cases of countries like Nigeria serves
.2 useful lesson for future mobilization against autocratic governments across the
Continent. In the end, if freedom cannot be bought and if democracy cannot be
Imposed from the outside, and can only therefore be fought for and earned by
mose who desire it, then members of prodemocracy movements, civil society
organizations and disaffected but patriotic elites must be at the frontlines of
regime change with their resources and lives, without which, external suppOrt for
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Notes
I Almough 10% import would appear insignificant on the surface, it is significant in rerms of the
volume this quantity rc:presents for Nigeria. The 10% import by me United States constirutes
approximatdy 5O'JI6 ofNigeri3.s total crude petroleum export_
lGenenJ. Sani Abacha died ofa hean: arrack onJune 8, 1998. He was replaced by the number three
officer in the Military government, General Abdulsalam Abubakar. The number twO man, Genera.!
Oladipo Diya was implicated in a coup attempt against Abacha, tried and sentenced to death.
VJhe concept of ro.st here is relevant fOr understanding and explaining United St'2tes' rational
calculations for imposing ecollOmic rather man other forms of sanctions against Nigeria- Some
analysts calculate the COSts of sanctions of both me sponsoring and the target: scares. This is largely
irrdevant because such ca.lculations do not cake intO account me a.!te~COSts [0 the sponsoring
scate of not imposing a particular form of sanction. For example, with the end of the Cold-War,
liberal democracy and capita.!ism have become parr ofthe variables for calculatingcosu ofalternatives
foregone if one foreign policy acrion is suppOrted against another. Thus, ifa state like Nigeria should
behave in ways that negate those intemationa.! norms and va.!ues supported by the U.S. without
adequate and immediate response. the COSt to the United States is both a Joss of credibility for her
ideological positions as well as the possibility thar more immediate economic and military COSts
might be needed at a much higher COS[ larer. For further discussion on the concept ofCOSt, sa: David
Raldwin, Economic Staucmft. NewJersey: Princeton Univenity Press,1985.
4Margaret Doxey, "International Sanctions; in David G. Haglund and Michael K. Hawes, eds..
World Politics; Power, I"urd~p~nd~llte & D~pt"de"". Toronco: H.arcourt BraceJovanovich, 1990,
p. 254. Doxey argues that the intent of the sponsoring state(s) varies from desiring a change in
the conduct of the t.arget government or even a change in the regime in power. Depending on the
intent ofthe sending scate{s), compliance and therefore effectiveness ofeconomic sanction becomes
a function of whether the incenr is to "administer public rebuke· which does not result in policy
shift by the target state, or the intent can be·symbolic· aimed at demonstrating support for existing
internationa.! values and norms like liberal democracy and free market economy. Applied to the
case of Nigeria, it seems clear thar the pro-sanction camp desires both a change in the conduct
of the Abach.a .administration and ultim.ately a change from milit.ary to a democratic system of
governance. The quesrion then becomes: what was the intent of the ClintOn Administration .and
the Commonwealth ofN.ations in thre.atening economic sanction apnst the Abacha regime~
SFor different meanings and uses of economic sanctions as instrument of statecraft, see for example,
D.avid A. Baldwin, Ec(1l1omic Stat«mft,op. Cit., and David Cortright and George A. Lopez. eds., EcOllClIlIic
Stmetiolls; P<1llac(<1 or P~a«building in a Post-Cold War World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,l995.
6 In this work, srrucrura.! power is defined as.a stare's or a coalition's control over policy OUtcomes
in a given context. Thus, the aim of the United States and its western allies in imposing economic
sanction ag.ainst autocratic government in Nigeriol would be to change the behavior of the regime
in the direction of holding free and &.ir democratic elections as well as ensuring a free m.arket
economy.
7Baldwin argues that orren the judgmenr whether economic sanction is effective or not is based
on a faulty logic that assumes other forms of influence attempts, like military intervention,
would have been more successful than economic sanctions. He insisrs that it is not so obvious
dut economic sanctions are not effective if the a.!ternacives are not ~own to h.ave been more
effective. For instance. [0 what exrenr was military sanction effective in bringing about a clunge in
)0
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me behavior of the North Vietnamese even though it seems to have been more costly monetarily,
In human lives lost and credibility for the U.S.~
"David Baldwin, p.1l6.
'The argumem here presupposes that Nigeria's monocultural economy is likely (0 experience
enough pressure to compel the regime (0 adjust its behavior in line with the expectations of the
sponsoring staters). However, I acknowledge the probability that the issue of human rights and
democratic governance may not be salient for the tegime, which therefore may nOt be likely co
respond in the desired manner. Thus the use of economic sanctions rather than result in a change
ofbchavior will tend to lead (0 an increase in repression of human rights and democracy advocates.
In that sense, such a reversal may actually hasten the desired policy outcome if repression leads
to the consolidation of the opposition against the regime rather than a "rally-around-the-f1ag" as
suggested by Galtung. Also, given the significance of crude petroleum to both scates, one would
think that Nigetia is also able to influence decisional omcomes in the United States, especially
where Nigeria expects certain outcome in U.S.-Africa relations. But given more alternative
sources ofcrude petroleum available to the U.S., it is plausible to expect the bilateral influence will
consistently favor the United States over Nigeria because of Nigeria's reliance on crude petroleum
for over 90% of her foreign earnings.
IllFor a discussion on the nature and scope of sensitivity and vulnerllbility of nations under such
pressure, see the seminal work by Robert O. KeohaneandJoseph S. Nye,Power llnd Interdependence:
World Politics in Tmnsition, 20<1 ed. Glenview IlL: Scoer, Foresman/Lircle Brown, 1989.
IISee Pearl-Alice Marsh, "The Case For Economic Sanctions against Somh Africa;' The World &
1(February 1990), pp. 595-603.
U It is important to note that apartheid as an ideology in Somh Africa may not have lasted as
long as it did without the Cold War·induced ideological division of the international system into
democratic!capitalist against socialistIcommunist states. The Unired States-led western coalition's
global strategy of containment provided a more effeaive support for the apartheid regime against
me African National Congress guerrilla war that was supported by the Cubans, the USSR and
other African states. And, following the end of the Cold War, the convergence of both the absence
of western suPPOrt and therefore suPPOrt for economic sanctions against the white minority
regime, the withdrawal of the Cubans and the effective organizational opposition of the ANC
forced a negotiated end to apartheid in South Africa.
USee Johan Galrung. "On the Effects of Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of
Rhodesia,~World Politics, 19 (1967), pp. 378-416.
Hln "Bargaining with the Instruments ofStarecrafc Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic
Sanctions Against Nicaragua and Libya;' Business in the Comemporary World (Summer, 1990), pp.66-
78, Kenneth A. Rodman argues that in the case of Nicaragua and Libya, the Reagan Administration
was able to effectively increase the uncertainties felt by the Transnational Corporations in the nvo
countries which resulted in the TNCs' acquiescence with economic sanctions and thereby became
themselves instruments of economic statecraft for advancing U.S. foreign policy goals. It should be
noted that the TNCs may have gone along with the Reagan Administration on sanctions against
libya and Nicaragua because public opinion in the U.S. were perceived both by the Administration
and the TNCs as supportive ofeconomic sanctions. Therefore, the TNCs may have feared a possible
boycott of their products in the U.s. and elsewhere.
3'
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ISKJaus Knorr, The PoWff ofNntio,u. New York: Basic Books In[.,(1975), p. 140.
16$u Kelechi A. Kalu, ·Political Economy in Nigeri:l: The Military, Ethnic Politics and
Developmem; InttrnationnlJournnl ofPoliticj, Cultuft nnd Society, vol. la, No.2, 1996 pp. 229-247
and*Dimensions of Ethnic Politics and Development in Nigeria,~JournnlofNigerinn Affnirs, Vol.
5, No.1 (March 1996), pp. 23-34 2S well2S Kelechi A. Kalu, Economic Del/dopmtnt nnd Nigerinn
Fortign Policy (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000): 35-47,
17See, for example, J. Isawa Elaigwu, "Echnicity and the Federal Option in Africa,· The Nigerian
Journal of Federalism, Vol I, No. I, (June 1994), pp. 69-85, Ih Udogu, Ihe Allurement of
Ethnonationalism in Niguian Politics: The Contempor.lry Debate,*Journai ofAsian and A.fritan
Studies, Vol. 29, Nos. 3 and 4 (July I994),Julius O. Ihonvbtte, "Irrelevant State and Et:hniciry in
Nigeria; Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17, Issue No.1 (1993).
l!()ne ofsever.ll interviews gtinted the author during visits to the Nigerian Insticute oflmemational
Affairs, Victoria Island, Lagos, in March and August 1995.
19Nduka Otiono, "No Regime should rake the people for a ride," Stntind, Vol. 1, No. 16 (June 13,
1994), p. 12.
1GCited in E. Ike Udogu, op. cit., p. 163.
JlSu Ayeni Olugbenga, "Which way fOrw2rd,- West AjriaJ (February 14-20. 1994), p. 255. Also
cited in E. Ike Udogu, op. cit.
:t20bafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom. (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), pp. 47-48. See
Udogu, op. cit., p. 164.
~)See Sheth, op. cit., p. 620.
:HSheth, op. dt., p. 621.
MRoben: L. Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic ofCapitalism. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1985), pp. 127-128.
lIliFor recent discussions on these issues~ Bob Herbert, ·UnhoUy Alliance: in Nigeria,* The Ntw
York Times, (Friday,January 26, 1996), p. Al5, Paul Lewis,-Nigeria's Deadly Oil War: Shell Defends
Irs R.econ::I; 1ht New York Times, (Tuesday, February 13, 1996), pp. AI-A4.Jean Damu and David
Bacon, "Oil Rules Nigeria,* The Blnck Scholar, (Winter and Spring 19%), Vol. 26, No.1, pp. 51-54.
17Unlike the caste sYStem in India, the colonial powers did nOt create the various ethnic groups in
Nigeria, but rather they exploited {he ethnicity of the inhabitantS, a practice that the indigenous
elites in Nigeria have failed to eradicate, but have instead intensified the colonial patterns of
exploiting ethnic identities. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for {his insight.
~ited in Yusufu Bala Osman, -Middlemen, ConsultantS, Contractors and the solutions to the
current Economic Crisis,- Studies in Politics and Society; Journal of the Nigtrian Political Science
AJsociation, Issue 0. 2 (October, 1984), p. 23.
29]". Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach."EoonomicSanctions 2S an instrument ofForeign Policy:
The Role of Domestic Politics,· lnttrnationallnttractiollS, VoL 21, No. 3, (I996), pp. 247-263.
Xllbid., pp. 259-260.
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UThe nature of the Abubabr transition through a comrived 1999 Nigerian Constirurion without
public debates and the extent Generals Abubakar and Babangida (red) gave blatant support to
the Elecrion of Retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to the presidency in 1999 is consistent with
the argument of this chapter. Thus, it might be too early to celebrate Nigeria's transition from
dictatorial to civilian regime.
)2General Sani Abacha died of sudden hean anack on 8<11 June 1998; and, General Abduisalam
Abubakar, a Hausa Muslim was prompdy appoimed Head of State and Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces. In his maiden address to the nation on June gh, 1998, General Abubakar
said, ~Fellow Nigerians, we remain fUlly committed to the socio-political transition programme
of General Sani Abacha's administration and will do everything to ensure its fUll and successfUl
implemcntation.N
nSee~Commonwealth won't sanction Nigeria,~Nigeria Today (March 1997), p. 4. As most analysts
familiar with post-colonial politics are aware, the Commonwealth of Nations under the general
guidance of Britain could nOt have been expected to impose economic sanctions against Nigeria
on a scale that could be effective. In the first instance, Britain as a major power has demonstrated a
remarkable capacity to consistently think in terms ofits national economic interests in dealing with
Nigeria. Secondly, on the issues of economic sanctions, Britain has not been an ardent supporter
of sanctions as illusttated by the sanctions against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the former
;lpartheid regimes in South Africa. Shell, a Bridsh concern has mOSt of the oil drilling contracts
in Nigeria as well as the new contracts on liquefied natural gas exploration. The decision not
to pursue effective economic sanctions against the Abacha regime was consistent with previous
British reaction in similar situations.
"'Assistant Secretary ofState for African Affairs, Ambassador George E. Moose's testimony before
lhe u.s. Foreign Relations Committee on ~U.S. Policy Toward Nigeria:' Washington, D.C. July
20, 1995. The discussion here on U.S. inrerestS in Nigeria is derived from Ambassador Moose's
teStimony.
~Ibid. According to Ambassador Moose, "... of central importance to all these goals, however is
(U.S. ] imerest in seeing Nigeria establish an open, democtatic system. It is our fitm belief that
;l democratic Nigeria that respeCts human rights and resolves issues of governance through the
democratic process will create a context within which our other inrerests can best be pursued.~
As a gesture of goodwill towards the opposition, General Abubakar released several political
prisoners, including former Head ofState, General OJusegun Ohasanjo. However, leaders of pro-
democracy movements in and outside of Nigeria remained skeptical of Abubakar's gesture until
.UI political prisoners, but, especially Chief M. K. O. Ahiola, the winner of the annulled 1993
presidential elenion in Nigeria was released. The skepticism of the pro-democracy groups was
confirmed when shortly before he was due tobe released from prison, Chief Abiola died under
suspicious circumstances.
"For a similar argument in the case of Canada, see Kim Richard Nossal, ~Canadian Sanctions
~nst Nigeria?" A Brief submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign
Aff.irs and International Trade, Ottawa, 14 December, 1995.
"'See Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador George E. Moose's testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. Policy Toward Nigeria, Washington,
D.C., July 20, 1995. For further background on U.S. interests in Nigeria, see "1995 Country
Rq>orts on Economic Policy and Trade Practices," a Department of State report submitted to
33
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the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on Finance and to tbe House Committees on
Foreign Affairs and on Ways and Means, May 1996.
)9For tbe relevance of the two-game metaphor, see Robert D. Putnam, -Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,- in Peter Evans, Ct. aI., Double-Edged Diplomacy:
International Bargaining and DomeJtic Politics. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993),
pp. 363-394.
4llJbid., p. 436. Also 5U, Kelecbi A. Kalu, Economic Drvelopment and Nigerian Foreign Policy (New
York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), especially chapter 4.
'tlSee Glenn Frankel. -Nigeria Mixes Oil And Money: A Potent Formula Keeps U.S. Sanctions at
Bay; Washington POSf, (Sunday, November 24, 1996), pp. CIA.
4)Ibid. Frankel also reportS that among the more influential represencatives of the Abacha regime
were Maurice Dawkins, a former Republican senatorial candidate in Virginia who r~cruited
prominent American Blacks for a fact-finding mission [0 Nigeria, and placed ads against sanctions
in every prominent Black newspaper, all paid for by the Abacha regime. The Black senator Carol
Moseley-Braun (D-m.) and Nation of Islam leader Louis Famkhan returned from their trips to
'igeria to argue againsr sanctions suggesting instead that the Abacha regime should have been
given rime to move igma towards a democratic system ofgovernance.
"'bid.
~Ibid. The statement by the council's executive director is apt. He argues that, "[wJe honesdy
don't believe a unilateral oil embargo against Nigeria would accomplish much except to further
concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few .... It's a grear press release but it would be
counterproductive.-
";For most observers of me political economy of Nigerian foreign relations, fe2ring a loss of economic
influence. Britain and France were IlO[ likely to supporr economic sanctions ag;Unst- Nigeria, especially if
such sanction involved. the oil secror to which hom countries are heavily im'esfed.
41David E Gordon and Howard Wolpc,lhe Other Africa: An End to Afro-Pessimism,- World
PolicyJournal, Spring 1998, pp: 49-59.
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